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I. Background

A.
The
Individuals
Education Act

with

Disabilities

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA") 1 has been at the forefront of American Special
Education Law for nearly four decades. The procedures
and practices required by the IDEA impact over seven

million students, and their parents, guardians, and
teachers, every day. 2 In exchange for funds provided to
state educational agencies and local educational
agencies, 3 the IDEA guarantees, among other things,

that those agencies will provide students with disabilities
a Free Appropriate Public Education ("FAPE") 4 in the

Least Restrictive Environment ("LRE"). 5 With those
funds, however, also comes accountability. The IDEA
mandates that fund recipient agencies meet procedural
safeguards 6 including the ability of parents and
guardians to challenge decisions made regarding
students' education and related services.7
1 Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat. 1142 (1990) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (2020)). This timeframe
includes the enactment of the predecessor legislation to the
IDEA, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773.

2 Students With Disabilities, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS,

https://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator-cgg.asp (last visited
Sept.
3 See
4 See
5 See
6 See
7 See

11, 2020).
20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2020).
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2016).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2016).
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(6) (2016).
20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2005).
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Inevitably, there is much disagreement about
what "appropriate" education for students with
disabilities means. Parents 8 and school systems often
find themselves at difficult impasses, leading to the
necessity for dispute resolution. 9 If the parties are not
able to reach an agreement about a student's
Individualized Education Program ("IEP"), 10 they then

may voluntarily proceed to mediation,1 1 or the parents
may challenge the IEP at an impartial due process
hearing, 12 typically heard before a hearing officer or
administrative law judge ("ALJ"). 13 If the parents are still
aggrieved with the determination of the due process
hearing, they are entitled to challenge the final state
decision by filing a civil action in any state court of
competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United
States.14
8 From here further the author will use the term "parent(s)" for
purposes of conciseness, but this term should be understood to
mean parents or guardians of a child.

9 See generally U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROCEDURES

UNDER

PART

B

OF

THE

INDIVIDUALS

WITH

DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT (PART B) MEMORANDUM (July 23,

2013), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdc
ltrs/acccombinedosersdisputeresolutiongafinalmemo-7-2313.pdf
10 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A) (2016).
II See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (2005).
12 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2005).
13 In some states, the impartial due process hearing is
conducted by the local educational agency, in which case the
parents may then appeal the local hearing officer's decision to
the state educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(g) (2005).
14 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i) (2005). In practice, however, almost
all challenges are brought in United States District Courts.
Anecdotally, practitioners explain that this is due to the
expertise and experience that the federal courts have in
deciding this type of matter. See Michael Gehring, Federal
Court Appeals of Decisions of Special Education Hearing
Officers,

MCANDREWS

LAW

OFFICES,

https://mcandrews

law.com/publications -and-presentations/articles/federal-court-
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It is important to understand that parents
generally are required to exhaust their administrative
remedies - complete the impartial due process hearing
and preceding procedures - before they may file suit in a
court of law. 15 This exhaustion requirement is also
applied to all other federal special education laws,
including "the Constitution, the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 [29 U.S.C.S. §§ 790 et seq.], or other Federal laws
protecting the rights of children with disabilities" when
the relief sought under those provisions would also be
available under the IDEA.16
B. Other Federal Special Education Laws

These other pieces of legislation are also an
important part of federal special education law and play
an important role in challenging systemic violations.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (commonly
referred to as "Section 504" in the special education
community) prohibits recipients of federal financial
assistance, including educational agencies, from
discriminating against individuals with disabilities. 17
Section 504 has its own cause of action, which may be
brought in the form of a civil rights suit.18 Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") 19
prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by state
and local governments regardless of whether they receive
appeals-of-decisions-of-special-education-hearing-officers/
(last visited December 11, 2020) ("almost all appeals are taken
by the party filing a lawsuit in the geographically appropriate

federal district court").
15 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1) (2005).
16
d
17 Pub L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 794).
18 See 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2009).
19
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified 42 U.S.C. § 12101
et seg).
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federal financial assistance.20 The civil rights remedies
available under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 are also
available to enforce the ADA. 21 The U.S. Department of
Education, Office of Civil Rights also provides
administrative enforcement of violations of Section 50422
and Title II of the ADA. 23 These civil rights
administrative remedies will be discussed further in the
latter part of this article. 24

Again, it is important to reiterate that civil causes
of action under these other laws are generally not
available when the relief sought is also available under
the IDEA's administrative remedies, until those
administrative remedies have first been exhausted. 25
Some courts have interpreted and applied this
exhaustion requirement in a very firm way, not allowing

any of these separate claims to proceed unless
administrative remedies have been exhausted, while
other courts have allowed a great deal more flexibility. 26
Exceptions to the exhaustion requirements in regard to
these provisions and the IDEA will be discussed further
in this article. 27

C. The Systemic and Class Action Background
of the IDEA

See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12133.
See generally 34 C.F.R. § 104.
23 See generally 28 C.F.R. § 35.
24 See infra p. 22. The administrative remedies provided by the
U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, do not
fulfill the exhaustion requirements under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
25 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1).
26 For a further discussion on this topic, see MARK C. WEBER,
DISABILITY HARASSMENT 86-90 (2007); see also 4 EDUCATION
LAW § 10C.13 (2019).
20

21
22

27

See infra p. 12.
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The IDEA's predecessor statute, the Education for

All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, was enacted for
the express purpose of addressing the systemic violations
of the civil rights of students with disabilities throughout
the United States. 28 The four stated purposes of the Act
were:

(1) "to

assure

that

all children

with

disabilities have available to them .... a

free appropriate public education
which emphasizes special education
and related services designed to meet
their unique needs"
(2) "to assure that the rights of children
with disabilities and their parents ....
are protected."
(3) "to assist States and localities to
provide for the education of all children
with disabilities," and
(4) "to assess and assure the effectiveness
of efforts to educate all children with
disabilities." 29
These stated purposes and the corresponding operative
sections of the Act were enacted in response to class
action litigation challenging civil rights violations of
students with disabilities.30 Specifically, the drafters of
the Act pointed to two cases, PennsylvaniaAssociation for
Retarded Children (P.A.R.C.) v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania3l and Mills v. Board of Education of the

28 Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773. (codified as amended at 20
U.S.C. § 1400(d)).
29
Id. at § 601(c).
30 See Mark C. Weber, IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 471 (2014).
31334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971); 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa.
1972).
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District of Columbia,32 upon which they relied heavily in
formulating the statute. 33

In P.A.R.C., a class of students with intellectual
disabilities brought the suit against the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania for denial of their right to a free public
education. 34 The parties ultimately agreed to a joint
decree in which Pennsylvania agreed to not enforce
certain statutory provisions that discriminated against
the students. 3 5 The order also stated that due to
Pennsylvania having undertaken to provide a free public
education to all children, that it was also their obligation
to provide:
[A] free, public program of education and
training
appropriate
to the
child's
capacity,
within
the
context of a
presumption that, among the alternative

programs of education and training
required by statute to be available,
placement in a regular public school class
is preferable to placement in a special
public school class and placement in a
special public school class is preferable to
placement in any other type of program of

education and training.3 6
Congress recognized this as the leading case whichbegan
a movement of other state and federal courts recognizing
the principle that all children with disabilities had a
constitutional right to public education. 37

Mills was also a class action suit brought by
several students with disabilities in the District of
32 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
33 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, Report.
34 P.A.R.C., 334 F. Supp. at 1259.
35
Id. at 1258-59.
36
Id. at 1260.
37 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, Report.
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Columbia, alleging that the District's public-school
system had not provided them with an adequate
education. 38 The court held that:
The defendants are required by the
Constitution of the United States, the
District of Columbia Code, and their own
regulations to provide a publicly-supported
education for these "exceptional" children.
Their failure to fulfill this clear duty to
include and retain these children in the
public school system, or otherwise provide
them with publicly-supported education,

and their failure to afford them due process
hearing and periodical review, cannot be
excused by the claim that there are
insufficient funds.39
The court then enjoined the school system from further
acts of discrimination, required an implementation plan
be reported to the court, and further required the District
to provide due process hearings in regard to students
with disabilities' educational programs, laying out
specific procedures to follow. 40 Congress recognized that
this was the first case recognizing a constitutional right
to publicly supported education "regardless of any
exceptional condition or handicap."41
The drafters of the Act observed that the notions
from the holdings in the aforementioned cases led to a
pattern among state and federal courts with similar
holdings that children with disabilities were entitled to a
free public, appropriate education. 42 In response to these
rulings, the drafters stated that Congress adopted Public
Law 93-380, allowing for one year of emergency
38 Mills,

348 F. Supp. at 868.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 877-83.
41 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, Report.
42 Id.
39
40
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appropriations and study of how a national program

should be implemented, assisting states with meeting
their obligation to provide free and appropriate public
education to all students with all disabilities. 4 3
Since the enactment of the Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, thousands of civil
actions have been brought over alleged violations of the
legislation's procedural and substantive protections.
Many of these suits have been class actions, a trend that
Congress has been aware of in its subsequent
amendments to the Act and other legislation, but has left
untampered. 44
II. Class Action Lawsuits Under the IDEA

Though class action litigation of special education
claims has been left unhindered by statutory law,
disfavor by some courts and policymakers of systemic
challenges, and increasingly stringent requirements to
form a representative class, have made it more difficult
to bring such actions. 45 To understand the problems
facing special education class actions, one must first
understand the challenges of initiating a class action to
begin with. We will begin with a brief review of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
controlling case law in this area.

and the current

A. Federal Rule of Procedure Rule 23
Federal class action lawsuits are governed by
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23.46 In order to
certify a representative class of plaintiffs, one must meet
43 Id. (citing Education Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-380,

88 Stat. 484).
44 Weber, supra note 30, at 476-77.
45 See e.g., Parent/Profl Advocacy League v. City of Springfield,
934 F.3d 13, 28 (1st Cir. 2019).
46 FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (2019).
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the obligations contained in this rule. To begin with, all
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) must be met, which states in
pertinent part:

(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of
a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all
members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the

claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly

and adequately protect the interests of the
class. 47

If all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) are met,
then at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b) must
also be met, which states in pertinent part:
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action
maybe maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied
and if:
(1)

prosecuting

separate actions by or

against individual class members would
create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual class members
that
would
establish
incompatible
standards of conduct for the party
opposing the class; or
(B)
adjudications
with

respect

to

individual class members that, as a
practical matter, would be dispositive of
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
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the interests of the other members not
parties to the individual adjudications or
would substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted

or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final
injunctive
relief
or
corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting

the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law
or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting

only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available
methods
for fairly
and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The matters
pertinent to these findings include:

(A) the class members' interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation

concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a
class action. 48
All of the above provisions have been heavily litigated at
courts of all levels. 49 Judges have applied varying levels
of scrutiny in ascertaining whether a prospective class
meets the requirements, and they have been interpreted
48

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).

49 See e.g., Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997);

Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998);
Anderson Living Trust v. WPX Energy Prod., LLC, 306 F.R.D.
312 (D.N.M. 2015).
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in broad and narrow ways. For purposes of this article,
the author will not labor into every interpretation of
every

part

of this Rule.5 0

However,

the

authority

currently having the biggest impact on IDEA class action
and other civil rights claims is the Supreme Court's
decision in Wal-Mart v. Dukes.51
B. The Supreme Court and Wal- Mart v. Dukes
In Wal-Mart v. Dukes, the Supreme Court decided
whether a class of 1.5 million female Walmart employees
alleging sex discrimination in employment decisions,
represented by three current or former employees, could
proceed as a certified class under Rule 23.52 Pertinently,
the Court addressed the commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a) as the main problem confronting the proposed
class.5 3 The Court held:
Commonality

requires

the

plaintiff to

demonstrate that the class members 'have
suffered the same injury,' .

. .

. [t]his does

not mean merely that they have all
suffered a violation of the same provision
of law . . . . [t]hat common contention,

moreover, must be of such a nature that it
is capable of classwide resolution--which
means that determination of its truth or
falsity will resolve an issue that is central
to the validity of each one of the claims in
one stroke. 54
In other words, the Court states that it is not as
important that the same legal claims are brought by the
class members, rather the focus is on the judgment that
50 For further discussion, see generally CLASS ACTIONS: THE
LAW OF 50 STATES § 6.01 et seq. (2019).

51 564 U.S. 338 (2011).

52 Id. at 343.
53 Id. at 346-49.
54Id. at 349-50.
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those class members seek and whether one ruling, and
corresponding same or similar relief, can resolve the
dispute for all class members.
The Court concluded that the commonality
requirement was not met in this case, because the
Walmart
employees'
challenge
of
individual
determinations are not altogether the result of some
overlying policy or other reason for the employment
decisions.55 The Court pointed to its decision in General
Telephone Co. v. Falcon,56 for examples of circumstances
in which a class action for employment discrimination
would likely be appropriate. 57 These examples included if
the company in question conducted a biased testing
procedure that resulted in prejudicial determinations or,
if there is "'[s]ignificant proof that an employer operated
under a general policy of discrimination,'" and the policy
manifested itself in the same or similar way through
subjective employment decision making. 58
After stating that the first example was clearly
not applicable in this case, the Court then concluded that
there was no evidence indicating that there was a
"general policy of discrimination." 59 The Court held that
the testimony of an expert witness who stated that there
was a disparate employment effect was not sufficient due
to the lack of certainty upon which that testimony was
based.6 0 The Court further observed that the only policy
in question was the policy of hiring discretion, which is
directly the opposite of what would be necessary for a
common discriminatory policy. 6 1

55

Id. at 352.
457 U.S. 147 (1982).
57
Dukes, 564 U.S. at 353.
58
Id. (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 (1982)).
59
Id. at 353.
60
Id. at 354.
61
Id. at 355-56.
56
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Shortly after this decision, its holding was applied
to IDEA class action lawsuits. 62 While the Dukes decision
was clearly a setback for special education and related
civil rights lawsuits, these cases have been able to
continue with some degree of success.6 3 Dividing a class
into subclasses has proven to be an effective means of
certifying these types of class actions 64

It is also briefly worth mentioning that many
states vary to the extent upon which they adopt and rely
on federal rules and interpretations in regard to such
procedural rules. 65 Bringing class action lawsuits in state
court, as opposed to federal court, may prove easier to

meet class certification
requirements
in some
jurisdictions, though plaintiffs bringing a state action
must be aware of potential removal of that action to
federal court. 66 State suits may be worth exploring in
certain situations, but will not be discussed further for
the purposes of this article.
C.

The

Exhaustion

Requirement

and

Exceptions

While the procedural rules and case law of class
actions have been a major hurdle for the certification of
IDEA class actions, other hurdles also emerge from the
IDEA itself. As previously mentioned, generally,
prospective plaintiffs must exhaust (complete) the
administrative remedies (procedures and hearings)
available to them under the IDEA when the relief sought
is available through those administrative processes. 67
Only upon exhausting those remedies may a civil action,
62 Weber, supra note 30, at 481.
63 Weber, supra note 30, at 481.
64
Weber, supra note 30, at 498-99.

See CLASS ACTIONS: THE LAW OF 50 STATES § 4.01 et seq.
(2019) for a survey of certain state class action requirements.
66 See 28 U.S.C. § 1446; 28 U.S.C. § 1453.
67 20 U. S. C. § 1415(1).
65
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challenging the findings and decision of the state and
local authorities below, be brought. 68 Some courts have
been willing to recognize exceptions to this exhaustion
requirement for certain situations, such as for the types
of systemic violations a class action would address, while
others have applied it regardless and without
appreciation of the allegations and circumstances. 69
The United States Supreme Court brought some
clarity to the issue of exhaustion in Fry v. Napoleon
Community Schools. 70 The Court held that "§ 1415()'s
exhaustion rule hinges on whether a lawsuit seeks relief
for the denial of a free appropriate public education
'FAPE'. . . [i]f a lawsuit charges such a denial, the
plaintiff cannot escape § 1415(1) merely by bringing her
suit under a statute other than the IDEA." 7 1 In
determining whether the suit is seeking redress for
denial of a FAPE, the Court said that one should look to
"the gravamen of a complaint" and see if it "seeks redress
for a school's failure to provide a FAPE, even if not
phrased or framed in precisely that way." 72 The Court
further advised that, in making this determination, one
should look to the other disability rights statutes (the
ADA, Rehabilitation Act, etc.) and ask if the same suit
could be filed in a non-education setting to seek the same
relief.73 If the answer is that a suit could be brought in
another setting and context, then it is less likely that the
issue would be redressable as a FAPE violation, and it is
less likely that exhaustion would be required. 74
The exhaustion requirement is not absolute, as
courts have universally recognized exceptions to the

68

See 20 U.S.C.

§ 1415(i).

69 WEBER, supra note 26, at 86.
70 137 S. Ct. 743 (2017).
71

72
73

74

Id. at 754.
Id. at 755.

Id. at 755-56.
Id.
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requirement. 75 The legislative history of the IDEA's
predecessor statute, the Education for All Handicapped
Children Act of 1975, also indicated that Congress was
well aware of exceptions to the exhaustion requirementespecially in regard to class action lawsuits. The sponsor
of the legislation, Senator Harrison Williams, stated on
the record:
[W]ith regard to complaints, I want to
underscore
that exhaustion of the
administrative procedures established
under this part should not be required for
any individual complainant filing a
judicial action in cases where such
exhaustion would be futile either as a legal
or practical matter. Nor is it intended that
the availability of these administrative
procedures be construed so as to require
each member of the class to exhaust such
procedures in any class action brought to
redress an alleged violation of the
statute.76

This history shows the nature of the exhaustion
requirement as Congress (or at least the drafters)
intended it to be in this provision, and also the nature of
its application to class action lawsuits, which will be
discussed further infra.
Federal courts have universally recognized the
exception alluded to in the above mentioned remarks,
that "parents need not exhaust the procedures set forth
in 20 U.S.C. § 1415 where resort to the administrative

75 Hoeft v. Tucson Unified Sch. Dist., 967 F.2d 1298, 1303 (9th

Cir. 1992). For a general discussion of the exhaustion
exceptions applied by various courts, see A.H. v. ClarksvilleMontgomery Cty. Sch. Sys., No. 3:18-cv-0081, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20060, at *13-15 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 7, 2019).
76 121 Cong. Rec. 37,416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Harrison
Williams).
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process would be either futile or inadequate." 77 The
futility and inadequacy principles are based on general
exhaustion principles of administrative law. 78 The
legislative history of the IDEA also recognizes a third
exception to the exhaustion requirement, that it is not
appropriate in certain situations to require the "use of

due process and review procedures set out in [20 U.S.C. §
1415(b) and (c)] of the [IDEA] before filing a law suit." 79
Such situations are present if:
'(1) it would be futile to use the due process
procedures.... ; (2) an agency has adopted
a policy or pursued a practice of general
applicability that is contrary to the law; (3)

it is improbable that adequate relief can be
obtained by pursuing administrative
remedies (e.g., the hearing officer lacks the
authority to grant the relief sought)'8 0 2
The court in Hoeft clarified that exhaustion is not
automatically excused when "policy underlying an
individual education program is challenged as unlawful,"
rather the term "'contrary to the law'.... suggests that
when only questions of law are involved in determining

the validity of a policy, as when the policy facially violates
the IDEA, exhaustion may not be required." 81
The Hoeft court also directly addressed the
exhaustion requirement in terms of class action lawsuits.
The court first rejected the notion that the class action
nature of the suit alone entitled the plaintiffs to bypass
the IDEA exhaustion requirement, holding that the
"administrative remedies are not inadequate simply
because a large class of plaintiffs is involved." 8 2 The court
did note that the exhaustion requirement, however, is
77 Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1303.
78

Id.

79

Id. (citing H.R. 296, 99th Cong. (1985)).
Id. at 1303-04 (citing H.R. 296, 99th Cong. (1985)).
81 Id. at 1305.
82 Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1309.
80
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applied differently in class actions, adopting the
legislative history mentioned previously. 83 The court
construed the legislative intent to be that, although not
every member of class must exhaust administrative
remedies, at least some of the members must meet the
exhaustion requirements. 84
Other courts have applied the exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement with a more systemic focus.

85

"When a plaintiff was denied a FAPE due to a systemic
problem that could not have been remedied by the
administrative complaint process," courts have often
found exhaustion to be futile. 86 It is especially noteworthy
that some courts have recognized a totally separate and
distinct exception to the exhaustion requirement for
systemic violations. 87 It appears most courts have
declined to recognize a separate systemic exception. 88

Some courts have excused the exhaustion
requirement altogether when a class action lawsuit's
claims are challenging a policy or practice that
constitutes a systemic violation, not requiring that any

Id. (citing 121 Cong. Rec. 37,416 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Harrison Williams)).
84 Id.
85 Clarksville-Montgomery Cty. Sch. Sys., 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20060, at *14-15.
86
Id. at *14 (citing D.R. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., No. 16-13694,
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222030, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 29,
2017)).
87 Id. at *15
(citing Urban by Urban v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist.
R-1, 89 F.3d 720, 725 (10th Cir. 1996)); see also Ass'n for Cmty.
Living v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040, 1044 (10th Cir. 1993); J.G. v.
Bd. of Educ., 830 F.2d 444, 446-47 (2nd Cir. 1987).
88 Id. at *14-15 (citing several unpublished cases from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit); see also
Parent/Profl Advocacy League v. City of Springfield, 934 F.3d
13, 28 (1st Cir. 2019) (declining to adopt a separate systemic
83

exception at this time).
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number of class members exhaust. 89 Most jurisdictions
have appeared to follow the legislative history of the
act,90 adopting the rule that generally at least some
members must exhaust their administrative remedies to
be excepted from the requirement. 9 1 This rule is applied
differently based on the facts of each individual case-in
some instances a minimal number would need to
exhaust, while in others, it could be possible that every
class member would be required to exhaust. 92
Plaintiffs have also had success in bypassing the
exhaustion requirement in some instances by merely
filing disability civil claims under other statutes,
disregarding the IDEA, or seeking to enforce the IDEA
requirements through civil rights claims.9 3

D. An Example: Parent/Professional Advocacy
League v. City of Springfield
Now that a framework has been laid, in showing
the challenges a prospective class of plaintiffs would face
in terms of procedural barriers and administrative
exhaustion requirements in bringing a class action, this
paper will briefly note a recent case to illustrate how
these barriers often times play out.
Parent/ProfessionalAdvocacy League v. City of
Springfield,94 initiated by the plaintiffs in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
89 See Handberry v. Thompson, 446 F.3d 335, 343 (2d Cir.
2006).
90 See 121 Cong. Rec. 37,416 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Harrison
Williams).
91 See Romer, 992 F.2d at 1045; Parent/Prof'lAdvocacy League,
934 F.3d at 32.
92 Parent/Prof'lAdvocacy League, 943 F. 3d at 32.
93 See discussion about this topic generally in Mark C. Weber,
Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1079, 1138-41 (2002).
94 934 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2019).
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sought relief for claims of alleged violations of Title II of
the ADA. 95 The suit specifically alleged that the local
school system was unnecessarily segregating students

with mental health disabilities into a separate and
inferior school. 96 One affected student brought this action
on behalf of himself and a class of "all students with a
mental health disability who are or have been enrolled at
[the separate school] ."97 The plaintiffs sought injunctive
and declaratory relief, including an order that the school
system provide "school-based behavior services in
neighborhood schools to afford [the students] an equal
educational opportunity and enable them to be educated
in neighborhood schools." 98 The district court denied class
certification. 99 The plaintiffs filed this consolidated
appeal challenging the district court's determination in
regard to class certification and the IDEA exhaustion
requirement.10 0

The court first determined that the relief sought
in this suit was relief available under the IDEA.10 1
Applying Fry,10 2 the court held that the "crux of the
complaint is that the defendants failed to provide the
educational instruction and related services that the
class plaintiffs need to access an appropriate education
in an appropriate environment."10 3 "That is not a claim of
simple discrimination; it is a claim 'contesting the
adequacy of a special education program."' 1 0 4 The court
95
96

97

Id. at 17.

Id.
Id. at 17-18. Two advocacy organizations also were joined as

plaintiffs in this case, but for purposes of this paper, their
claims and subsequent resolution will not be analyzed.
98
Id. at 18.
99
Id. (citing S.S. v. City of Springfield, 318 F.R.D. 210, 224 (D.
Mass. 2016)).
100

101
102

Id.
Id. at 25.

Id. at 24-25 (citing Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 756).

103

Id. at 25.

104

Id. (citing Fry, 137 S. Ct. at 755).
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further observed that though the language of claims
tracks that of ADA regulations, the claims still allege
that the IDEA obligation that students be put in the least
restrictive environment possible has been violated.10 5
The court also observed that it was telling that the
representative plaintiff first filed an administrative
complaint under the IDEA, with the same allegations,
before initiating this suit with ADA claims.10 6

Having concluded that the relief sought in the suit
was available under the IDEA, and thus also subject to
the IDEA's exhaustion requirement, the court proceeded
to review the plaintiff's argument that an exception to the
exhaustion requirement should be applied to an IDEA
claim alleging systemic failures of the school system.10 7
Analyzing decisions of other circuits applying such an
exception, the court said that none of those applications
are present here, as the plaintiffs suit is not "systemic"
in the sense "contemplated by any such exception."10 8 The
court pointed to the individual determinations that
would be necessary for each student and the lack of a
"uniform system-wide policy 'enforced at the highest
administrative level"' that is being challenged.1 0 9 Due to
such exception not being applicable here, the court
declined to adopt such a rule.1 10
The court next proceeded to review the decision to
decline certification of the proposed class. 1 The court
began its analysis by stating that Dukes was applicable
in this case.11 2 Applying these standards to special

education suits the court observed:

105

Id.

106 Id. at 25-26 (citations omitted).
107
Id. at 27.
108

Id. at 27-28.
Id. (citing Hoeft, 967 F.2d at 1305).
110Id. at 28.
11
i Id.
112 Id. (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350).
109
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"in class actions relating to special
education (which are usually brought
under the IDEA), plaintiffs can satisfy
Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement by
identifying a uniformly applied, official
policy of the school district, or an unofficial
yet well-defined practice, that drives the
alleged violation." 113
The court further observed that "[i]dentification of an
unofficial yet well-defined practice (or set of practices)
that is consistently and uniformly applied might also
satisfy the commonality prerequisite." 114
The plaintiffs
attempted
to satisfy
the
commonality requirement by using expert testimony

showing that a sample of the students segregated into the
separate school did require such a placement, and further
that the education provided at the separate school was
inferior to the education provided at a regular school in
the system.1 1 5 The court stated that the problem with this
expert opinion was "that the report claims to find a
pattern of legal harm common to the class without
identifying a particular driver-'a uniform policy or
practice that affects all class members'-of that alleged
harm." 116 This was the same problem that the plaintiffs
faced in Dukes.11 7 The court held that, absent some
common policy being challenged, the appropriateness of
each students educational placement would likely have
to be determined individually rather than there being one
common answer to that inquiry.11 8 The court held that

113

Id. at 29.

114 Id
115

Id. at 29-30.

Id. at 30 (citing DL v. District of Columbia, 713 F.3d 120
(D.C. Cir. 2013)).
117 Id. (citing Dukes, 564 U.S. at 350).
118 Id. at 31.
116
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the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
class certification for lack of commonality.1 1 9
The court also reviewed the district courts
determination that all class members must exhaust their
administrative remedies before forming a class. 120 The
court observed that only the representative plaintiff had
exhausted his administrative remedies. 12 1 The court
noted that this could prove problematic for purposes of a
civil action, given that individual students' conditions
would differ greatly and the resulting administrative
process would look different and likely yield different
results for each student. 122 The court briefly surveyed the
rules applied by other circuits as to how many class
members must exhaust in varying circumstances. 123 The
court adopted the approach of the Tenth Circuit, holding
that not every plaintiff in a class action would need to
exhaust, but the number needed would depend on the
circumstances of the case. 124 Here, the court concluded
that one plaintiff exhausting their remedies did not
suffice, a conclusion supporting the decision to decline
the certification of the class. 125
III.

Other

Means

of

Challenging

Systemic

Violations
Now that we have completed our review of some
of the problems facing prospective class action plaintiffs,
it is important briefly to consider alternative legal
methods to challenge systemic violations of special
education and related disability rights laws in an
119 Id.
120

Id.

121 Id.

122
123

Id. at 31.

Id.

at 32.

124 Id. (citing Ass'n for Cmty. Living v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040,
1045 (10th Cir. 1993)).
125
Id. at 32-33.
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educational context. While the relief is generally
somewhat limited in these venues, it is more readily
available, generally cheaper, and there are far fewer
barriers to initiate the relief.
Alleging Systemic Violations in Individual Due Process
Hearings and Subsequent Civil Actions
Although the due process procedures under the
IDEA are generally concerned with deciding individual
determinations, that does not preclude allegations of a
more
systemic nature being raised in these
proceedings. 126 Furthermore, establishing systemic
violations and practices on the administrative level forms
a record upon which trial courts can review these
allegations. The district courts and state courts in a
subsequent civil action would have greater latitude to
grant broader relief both for the individual plaintiff and
in regard to the larger education system. 127

A. State Administrative Complaints
Under the IDEA Federal Regulations, a state
education agency must adopt state complaint procedures

that may be filed alleging violations of the IDEA. 128 This
provision allows for remedies including those that
address "(1) The failure to provide appropriate services,
including corrective action appropriate to address the
needs of the child (such as compensatory services or
monetary reimbursement); and (2) Appropriate future
provision of services for all children with disabilities."129
Individuals
seeking
relief under
these
state
administrative complaints should seek information from
their state department of education or equivalent state

See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i).
127 See Weber, supra note 29, at 500-01.
128 34 C.F.R. § 300.151 (2019).
129 34 C.F.R. § 300.151(b) (emphasis added).
126
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educational agency.130 While relief typically appears to be
limited to the state enforcing the IDEA against local
education agencies' violative practices and ensuring that
they do not continue, further relief may be available in
limited circumstances, possibly against the state itself if
the administrative enforcement and monitoring is
inadequate. 131
B. U.S. Department of Education, Office of
Civil Rights Complaint
The U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) receives complaints and investigates
alleged violations of, among other civil rights laws, Title
II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973.132 OCR has the authority to bring limited actions
to enforce the provisions of these statutes. 1 33 It should be
noted, however, that the vitality of OCR complaints in
regard to systemic violations has been called into
question at the time of this article's drafting. 134
Nevertheless, OCR complaints remain an avenue for
relief that has traditionally been a favored method by
aggrieved parents or advocacy organizations.
C. Pursuing Legislative Remedies

130

For an example of state procedures, see TENN. DEP'T OF

EDUC.,

GUIDE

TO

SPECIAL

EDUCATION

ADMINISTRATIVE

COMPLAINTS (2015), https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/educ
ation/legal/legaladministrative_complaint-guide.pdf.
131 See Corey H. v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi., 534 F.3d 683 (7th Cir.
2008).
132 See Office of Civil Rights, About OCR, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/aboutocr.html
(last
visited Nov. 14, 2020).

See id.
134 See Laura Meckler, Betsy DeVos's Civil Rights Office Closes
133

More Cases than Predecessor, WASH. POST, July 10, 2019.
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Finally, legislative solutions represent potential
effective and meaningful ways for individuals and groups
to redress systemic problems in special education and
education policy in general. Having a conversation with

local board of education members, state administrative
officials, state legislators, federal administrative
officials, and members of Congress can prove to be a very
helpful and insightful way to resolve disputes and seek
policy change in a broad, impactful way.
IV. Conclusion
Class action lawsuits have always been an
inherent part of special education litigation. From the
enactment of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA) to the current day, class actions have been
used to address and redress many systemic violations of
the constitutional and statutory right of students with
disabilities to receive a free, appropriate public
education. Though it has become increasingly difficult to
initiate such class actions due to procedural constraints,
the courts have shown that they are not willing to
foreclose all class relief. Class actions remain a viable and
vital tool in ensuring that the rights of students with
disabilities are protected now and in the future. Class
actions and other administrative remedies can and
should be used to address systemic failures on the part of
America's public schools.
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